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This chapter1 identifies decisions by the U.S. Supreme
Court and selected federal circuit and high state courts in the past
year that interpret and apply the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)
and could have an impact on securities arbitration practice.2
I.

SUPREME COURT

For the first time in several years, the Supreme Court has
not decided an arbitration case in the time period since the
publication of the previous PLI Arbitration Law Update. The
Court did, however, grant a petition for a writ of certiorari in one
case.
In DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia,3 the Supreme Court
agreed to hear an appeal from a California Court of Appeal
decision4 holding that a California choice of law clause in the
parties’ arbitration agreement (which the parties agreed was
governed by the FAA) trumped the federal law-based FAA
preemption doctrine (which provides that the FAA preempts
conflicting state law). In DIRECTV, consumers filed a class action
in state court against the satellite television provider for charging
customers an early termination fee allegedly in violation of various
California statutes.5 The form contract governing the satellite
service contained a pre-dispute arbitration clause, a class action
waiver, and a choice of law clause that provided:

1

In writing this chapter, I am grateful for the able research assistance of
Rana Marie Abihabib, Pace Law School, J.D. candidate 2016.
2
9 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. (2014). Because disputes resolved through
securities arbitration necessarily “involve commerce” (FAA § 2), courts
apply the FAA to legal issues arising out of securities arbitrations. See
Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (2002).
3
135 S.Ct. 1547 (2015).
4
See Imburgia v. DIRECTV, Inc., 170 Cal.Rptr.3d 190 (2014), cert.
granted, 135 S.Ct. 1547 (2015).
5
Id. at 192-93.
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“The interpretation and enforcement of this
Agreement shall be governed by the rules and regulations
of the Federal Communications Commission, other
applicable federal laws, and the laws of the state and local
area where Service is provided to you. This Agreement is
subject to modification if required by such laws.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, Section 9 [the arbitration
clause including class action waiver] shall be governed by
the Federal Arbitration Act.”6
Notably, the class action waiver clause also stated: “If, however,
the law of your state would find this agreement to dispense with
class arbitration procedures unenforceable, then this entire Section
9 is unenforceable.”7
Based on this sentence, defendants did not initially move
to compel arbitration because the governing law of California at
the time – known as the Discover Bank rule8 – would have voided
the arbitration agreement as unconscionable due to the class action
waiver. However, after the Supreme Court held in AT&T Mobility
v. Concepcion9 that the FAA preempted California’s Discover
Bank rule, defendants moved to compel individual arbitration.10
The trial court denied the motion and the California Court
of Appeal affirmed. The Court of Appeal interpreted the class
action waiver provision and found that reigning California law
“would find this agreement to dispense with class arbitration
procedures unenforceable.”11 As a result, the entire arbitration
Id. at 193 (quoting parties’ agreement).
Id. (quoting parties’ agreement).
8
Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005)
(classifying most class action waivers in consumer contracts as
unconscionable).
9
131 S.Ct. 1740 (2011).
10
DIRECTV, 170 Cal.Rptr.3d at 193.
11
Id.
6
7
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clause was not enforceable, according to the precise language of
section 9 of the contract. The Court rejected defendant’s argument
that Discover Bank was no longer state law because it was
preempted, and instead accepted plaintiffs’ argument that it should
interpret state law without regard to FAA preemption.12
Because the California Court of Appeal’s decision
conflicts with a Ninth Circuit holding that the FAA preemption
doctrine supersedes the parties’ choice of law clause,13 DIRECTV
sought review in the Supreme Court (the California Supreme Court
had denied its request for review.) The question presented
is: “Whether the California Court of Appeal erred by holding, in
direct conflict with the Ninth Circuit, that a reference to state law
in an arbitration agreement governed by the Federal Arbitration
Act requires the application of state law preempted by the Federal
Arbitration Act.”14
It is not likely that the Supreme Court will permit parties
to opt out of the FAA preemption doctrine via a choice of law
clause, particularly if the arbitration contract is governed by the
FAA. The Court will likely distinguish Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd.
of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ.,15 in which the Supreme
Court held that parties can avoid the application of the FAA
through a choice-of-law clause in their pre-dispute arbitration
agreement. However, Volt involved the alleged preemption of a
state procedural rule favoring arbitration, not preemption of a
substantive state anti-arbitration principle. Thus, I predict that the
Court will reverse the California Court of Appeal’s decision.

12

Id. at 194-97.
See Murphy v. DirecTV, Inc., 724 F.3d 1218 (9th Cir. 2013).
14
Pet. for Writ of Cert., DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 2014 WL 5359805
(U.S. Oct. 21, 2014).
15
489 U.S. 468 (1989).
13
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II.

FEDERAL COURT DECISIONS

The remainder of this chapter summarizes decisions from
lower federal courts and state high courts applying the Supreme
Court’s FAA jurisprudence when ruling on challenges to the
arbitrability of a particular dispute and on motions to confirm or
vacate arbitration awards. Where applicable, the chapter will
discuss implications for FINRA arbitration.
A.

Who Decides Arbitrability?

It is well-settled that courts, not arbitrators, decide
challenges to substantive arbitrability of a dispute “’unless the
parties clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise.’”16 Lower
courts continue to find that the incorporation by reference of a
forum’s rules that permit arbitrators to decide arbitrability
constitutes such “clear and unmistakable evidence.”17 In an
interesting twist that calls to mind a state court’s hostility to
arbitration, the Supreme Court of West Virginia recently held that
a clause stating that “[t]he arbitrator(s) shall determine all issues
regarding the arbitrability of the dispute” is NOT clear and
unmistakable evidence that the parties intended arbitrators to
decide an unconscionability challenge to the arbitration
agreement.18

16

Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S 79, 83 (2002).
E.g., Eckert/Wordell Architects, Inc. v FJM Properties of Willmar
LLC, 756 F.3d 1098, 1100 (8th Cir. 2014) (holding that arbitrators decide
threshold question of whether nonsignatory can compel signatory to
arbitrate because arbitration agreement incorporates by reference AAA
rules).
18
See Schumacher Homes of Circleville, Inc. v. Spencer, --- S.E.2d ----,
2015 WL 1880234 (W. Va. Apr. 24, 2015).
17
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B.

Defenses to Arbitrability

In deciding questions of arbitrability, courts must apply the
Moses H. Cone presumption of arbitrability,19 but must compel
arbitration of only those disputes that the parties contracted to
submit to arbitration. Thus, courts must construe the terms of the
parties’ arbitration agreement like any other contract to give effect
to the parties’ intent.20
Even if a court finds that a dispute falls within the scope of
an arbitration agreement, the dispute might not be arbitrable under
a few limited exceptions. Under the Supreme Court’s most recent
FAA jurisprudence, courts must enforce arbitration agreements
according to their precise terms unless:
1. there is an explicit contrary congressional command;
2. the arbitration agreement expressly strips one party of the
substantive right to pursue a federal statutory claim; or
3. a state law contract defense invalidates the agreement, but
only if that defense doesn’t discriminate against
arbitration, and doesn’t frustrate the purposes of the
FAA.21

19

See Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460
U.S. 1, 24 (1983) (instructing courts to presume a dispute is arbitrable).
20
See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 682
(2010) (stating that “as with any other contract, the parties' intentions
control”) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
21
See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S.Ct. 2304 (2013)
(holding that claimants can establish they cannot vindicate their federal
statutory rights only if they show they are stripped of the right to pursue
them, not the ability to pursue them); CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood,
132 S.Ct. 665 (2012) (reaffirming that federal statutory claims are
arbitrable absent an explicit “contrary congressional command”); AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740 (2011) (ruling that FAA
preempts state law unconscionability defense that declares class action
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This section summarizes important federal Courts of
Appeal decisions that have ruled on challenges to an arbitration
agreement based on these principles.
1. Scope
Courts sometimes conclude that a particular dispute is not
encompassed within the scope of the parties’ arbitration
agreements. For example, in The NASDAQ OMX Group, Inc. v.
UBS Securities, LLC,22 the Second Circuit found that UBS’
indemnification claims against the NASDAQ stock market for its
trading losses stemming from trading delays on the morning of
Facebook’s 2012 initial public offering were not covered by an
arbitration agreement because they were encompassed within an
express carve-out. In that case, UBS sought to arbitrate its
indemnification claims in the American Arbitration Association
(AAA) pursuant to the parties’ Services Agreement. That
Agreement provided that the parties agree to submit all disputes
arising out of the agreement to arbitration at AAA, “[e]xcept as
may be provided in the NASDAQ OMX requirements.”23 In lieu
of answering, NASDAQ filed an action in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York seeking, inter
alia, a preliminary injunction halting the arbitration proceeding.
The district court granted the injunction, and UBS appealed.24
On appeal, after addressing issues of jurisdiction, the
Court of Appeals rejected UBS’ argument that an arbitrator, not
the district court, should have decided the arbitrability of the
dispute. It found that the Services Agreement did not “clearly and
unmistakably direct that questions of arbitrability be decided” by

waivers in consumer arbitration agreements per se unconscionable as
inconsistent with the FAA).
22
770 F.3d 1010 (2d Cir. 2014).
23
Id.at 1016.
24
Id. at 1017.
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the arbitrator.25 On the merits question of arbitrability, the court of
Appeals concluded that the Services Agreement carved out UBS’
claims against NASDAQ from the arbitration clause.26 The court
reasoned that, since the NASDAQ OMX requirements referenced
in the arbitration clause include the regulations allegedly violated
by NASDAQ which caused UBS’ trading losses, disputes
stemming from those violations were exempted from the clause.27
2.

Contrary Congressional Command

Even if a dispute falls within the scope of an arbitration
agreement, courts can refuse to enforce the agreement as to federal
statutory claims if “the FAA’s mandate has been ‘overridden by a
contrary Congressional command.’”28 Courts have held that one
such explicit command is found in §922 of the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (“DoddFrank”).29 That section declares that pre-dispute arbitration
agreements purporting to require arbitration of whistleblower
claims arising under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”)30
are not enforceable.31
However, at least one court has held that this noarbitration provision does not apply to whistleblower claims
25

Id. at 1032.
Id. at 1033.
27
Id. at 1034.
28
Italian Colors, 133 S.Ct. at 2309 (citing CompuCredit Corp. v.
Greenwood, 132 S.Ct. 665, 668-69 (2012)) (second internal citation
omitted).
29
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
30
Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
31
18 U.S.C. § 1514A(e)(2) (2012); see Laubenstein v. Conair Corp., No.
5:14-CV-05227, 2014 WL 6609164, at *4 (W.D. Ark. Nov. 19, 2014)
(slip op.) (holding that arbitration agreement is unenforceable as to
plaintiff’s wrongful termination claim arising under SOX). §806 of SOX
gives a right of action to “whistleblowers” who report fraud at publiclytraded companies. See 18 U.S.C. §1514A (2012).
26
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arising under Dodd-Frank. In Khazin v. TD Ameritrade Holding
Corp.,32 a former employee of TD Ameritrade sued his former
employer in federal district court, alleging he was terminated in
retaliation for reporting securities law violations to his supervisor.
He claimed the termination violated the whistleblower protections
accorded to him under Dodd-Frank.33 TD moved to dismiss the
complaint and compel arbitration pursuant to a pre-dispute
arbitration agreement the employee signed when he began his
employment at TD. The district court granted the motion to
compel arbitration.34
The Third Circuit affirmed. Addressing an issue of first
impression, the Court of Appeals held that the “anti-arbitration”
provision of Dodd-Frank rendered unenforceable pre-dispute
arbitration agreements with respect to whistleblower claims under
SOX non-arbitrable, but not with respect to those arising under
Dodd-Frank.35 The Court noted that whistleblower causes of
action arising under SOX are “substantively different” from those
arising under Dodd-Frank, and “each has its ‘own prohibited
conduct, statute of limitations, and remedies.’”36 The Court of
Appeals closely examined the statutory language and concluded
that Congress intended to apply its non-arbitration provision in
Dodd-Frank to SOX whistleblower claims only; not to Dodd-Frank
whistleblower claims.37 Thus, claimant’s claims were arbitrable.

32

773 F.3d 488 (3d Cir. 2014).
See 15 U.S.C. § 78u–6(h)(1)(B)(i). This section of Dodd-Frank gives a
private right of action to “whistleblowers” who are terminated in
retaliation for providing information to the SEC, “participating in an SEC
proceeding, or making disclosures required or protected under [SOX] and
certain other securities laws.” Lawson v. FMR LLC, 134 S. Ct. 1158,
1174 (2014) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78u–6(a)(6), (b)(1), (h)).
34
773 F.3d at 490.
35
Id. at 492.
36
Id. at 491 (citing Ahmad v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 2 F. Supp.3d 491,
497 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)).
37
Id. at 492-94.
33
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Practitioners asserting whistleblower claims should be sure
to cite the correct statutory authority for clients’ claims, especially
if they want to avoid arbitration, as pre-dispute arbitration
agreements are non-enforceable with respect to SOX, but not
Dodd-Frank, whistleblower claims.
In another case in which the court refused to compel
arbitration in light of a competing statute, National Credit Union
Administration Board v. Goldman, Sachs & Co.,38 the liquidating
agent for a failed credit union sued an investment bank, claiming
that the bank committed securities fraud in the offering documents
covering sales of residential mortgage-backed securities. The
district court for the Southern District of New York denied the
bank's motion to compel arbitration.39
The Court of Appeals affirmed and held that, inter alia,
the liquidating agent could repudiate the arbitration agreement
pursuant to its statutory repudiation powers under the Financial
Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA).40
While the court does not reference the Federal Arbitration Act or
the “contrary congressional command” exception to the
enforceability of arbitration agreements, one can infer that the
court found that the statute providing the National Credit Union
Administration Board with the power to repudiate agreements,
FIRREA, superseded the FAA’s mandate that arbitration
agreements be enforced according to their terms.
3.

Effective Vindication: Enforceability of
Class Action Waivers

Another defense to arbitrability that disputants have
asserted is that a court should not enforce an arbitration agreement
38

775 F.3d 145 (2d Cir. 2014).
Id. at 146.
40
See 12 U.S.C. §1787 (2014).
39
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because enforcement would prevent them from vindicating their
statutory rights. In Am. Exp. Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant,41
the Supreme Court limited this “effective vindication” doctrine to
cases where claimants can establish they are stripped of the right to
pursue statutory rights, not the ability to pursue them. In the past
year, based on Italian Colors, at least one federal circuit has
enforced a class action waiver in an arbitration clause against an
“ineffective vindication” challenge.42
4.

State law defenses
a.

Unconscionability

Under the Supreme Court’s FAA preemption doctrine, the
FAA preempts any state law or rule that conflicts with the policies
and purposes underlying the FAA.43 While the Supreme Court in
AT&T Mobility applied this preemption doctrine to bar lower
courts from finding class action waivers in arbitration agreements
to be substantively unconscionable under state law,44 lower courts
continue to strike down arbitration clauses as unconscionable on
other grounds. For example, in Jackson v. Payday Financial,
LLC,45 the Seventh Circuit found an arbitration clause in a payday
loan agreement to be unconscionable. In that case, plaintiffs, a
41

133 S.Ct. 2304 (2013).
See, e.g., Torres v. Simpatico, Inc., 781 F.3d 963 (8th Cir. 2015)
(rejecting unit franchisees’ ineffective vindication challenge to a
franchise agreements’ arbitration clause with a class action waiver).
43
See, e.g., Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 132 S.Ct. 1201
(2012) (holding that the FAA preempts West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals rule that voided as against public policy pre-dispute arbitration
clauses in nursing home contracts with respect to negligence claims);
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740 (2011) (holding that
FAA preempts California’s Discover Bank rule that class action waivers
in consumer arbitration agreements are unconscionable).
44
See, e.g., Torres v. Simpatico, Inc., 781 F.3d 963 (8 th Cir. 2015) (class
action waiver clause not unconscionable).
45
764 F.3d 765, 781 (7th Cir. 2014).
42
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putative class of borrowers who obtained allegedly usurious
payday loans from an enrolled member of the Cheyenne River
Sioux Tribe, sued the lender for various violations of Illinois laws.
The district court dismissed the action for improper venue because
the loan agreements contained a forum selection clause that
required all disputes be resolved through arbitration conducted by
the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe.46
The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the “arbitral
mechanism specified in the agreement is illusory.”47 The court
noted that the forum specified “does not exist: The Cheyenne
River Sioux Tribe ‘does not authorize Arbitration,’ it ‘does not
involve itself in the hiring of ... arbitrator[s],’ and it does not have
consumer dispute rules.”48
The court further concluded that the illusory agreement
was procedurally and substantively unconscionable under Illinois
law.49 The court stated:
It is procedurally unconscionable because the Plaintiffs
could not have ascertained or understood the arbitration
procedure to which they were agreeing because it did not
exist. It is substantively unconscionable because it allowed
the Loan Entities to manipulate what purported to be a fair
arbitration process by selecting an arbitrator and
proceeding according to nonexistent rules.50
Therefore, the arbitration clause was not enforceable.

46

Id. at 768.
Id.
48
Id. at 776 (citing evidence in the record).
49
Id. at 778, 780 (“The arbitration clause here is void not simply because
of a strong possibility of arbitrator bias, but because it provides that a
decision is to be made under a process that is a sham from stem to
stern.”).
50
Id. at 781.
47
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b.

Waiver

Another state law-based defense to the obligation to
arbitrate is the waiver doctrine. Under this doctrine, one party to
an arbitration clause claims the other party waived its right to
arbitrate based on conduct in related litigation. While the
arbitration waiver test varies slightly among the federal circuits,
courts typically consider factors such as: (1) the time elapsed from
commencement of litigation to the request for arbitration; (2) the
amount and nature of litigation, including substantive motions and
discovery; and (3) prejudice to the party opposing arbitration.51
This past year, courts continued to examine these factors
when ruling on waiver arguments. For example, in Joca-Roca
Real Estate, LLC v. Brennan,52 an asset purchaser sued the seller
for fraud in court, even though the asset purchase agreement
contained an arbitration clause. After the parties engaged in
extensive discovery, including sixteen depositions, substantial
interrogatories and document production, and four discovery
conferences before the magistrate, plaintiff moved to stay
proceedings pending arbitration.53 Defendant objected, arguing
plaintiff had waived its right to arbitrate.54
The court first identified a “salmagundi of factors”
relevant to the determination as to whether a party waived its right
to arbitrate.55 Those factors include: “the length of the delay, the

See, e.g., Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, P.A. v. NCR Corp.,
376 F. App’x 70, 71 (2d Cir. 2010); see also Zuckerman Spaeder, LLP v.
Auffenberg, 646 F.3d 919, 924 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“By this opinion we
alert the bar in this Circuit that failure to invoke arbitration at the first
available opportunity will presumptively extinguish a client's ability later
to opt for arbitration.”).
52
772 F.3d 945 (1st Cir. 2014).
53
Id. at 947.
54
Id.
55
Id. at 948.
51
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extent to which the party seeking to invoke arbitration has
participated in the litigation, the quantum of discovery and other
litigation-related activities that have already taken place, the
proximity of the arbitration demand to an anticipated trial date, and
the extent to which the party opposing arbitration would be
prejudiced.”56
In concluding that plaintiff had waived its arbitration right,
the court found, “the plaintiff commenced a civil action,
vigorously prosecuted it, and then—after many months of active
litigation—tried to switch horses midstream to pursue an arbitral
remedy. To make matters worse, it made this abrupt about-face in
the absence of any material change in circumstances.”57 The court
also had no difficulty finding prejudice to the defendant in the
form of the substantial time and cost it devoted to the litigation.58
In contrast, in Shy v. Navistar Int’l Corp.,59 an accounting
dispute, the Sixth Circuit held that defendant-appellant had not
waived its right to arbitrate a dispute with intervenor-appellee.
The case arose out of a consent decree settling a class action
lawsuit relating to Navistar’s obligations to its retired employees.
The fiduciary for the trust set up to receive profit-sharing
contributions from defendant sought to intervene into the class
action to challenge the calculation of those contributions.60 The
agreement setting up that entity, however, contained a dispute
resolution clause requiring an accounting arbitration if disputes
over such calculations arose.61
56

Id.
Id. at 948-49.
58
Id. at 949; see also In re Checking Account Overdraft Litig., 754 F.3d
1290, 1296 (11th Cir. 2014) (by pursuing arbitrability challenge in
district court and losing, bank waived its right to invoke delegation clause
in arbitration agreement that delegated to arbitrator the power to decide
arbitrability disputes).
59
781 F.3d 820 (6th Cir. 2015).
60
Id. at 822.
61
Id. at 822-23.
57
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Defendant opposed the motion to intervene. However,
once it was granted and the fiduciary filed an amended complaint
against defendant in the class action, defendant moved to dismiss
the complaint on the ground that those claims belonged in
arbitration.62 The district court denied the motion to dismiss and
ruled, sua sponte, that defendant had waived its right to arbitration
by its conduct before and during litigation.63
The Court of Appeals reversed. The court noted that “[a]
party waives arbitration if it acts in a manner ‘completely
inconsistent with any reliance on an arbitration agreement’ or
delays asserting arbitration ‘to such an extent that the opposing
party incur[red] actual prejudice.’”64 The court also held that
“[b]oth inconsistency and actual prejudice are required.”65 After
examining defendant’s conduct and the timing of its various
motions in the related litigation, the court concluded that its
conduct was not totally inconsistent with its right to arbitrate and,
in any event, it caused no actual prejudice because plaintiff
“wasted relatively few resources on unnecessary litigation.”66
c.

Lack of Mutual Assent

Another common law contract doctrine that disputants can
assert as a defense to arbitrability is the parties did not enter into a
valid contract due to a lack of mutual assent. In Knutson v. Sirius

62

Id. at 824.
Id.
64
Id. at 827-28 (citing Hurley v. Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas, 610
F.3d 334, 338 (6th Cir.2010)).
65
781 F.3d at 828.
66
Id. at 830. The dissent vigorously disputed both of these findings. Id.
at 831-37; see also Rushaid v. Nat’l Oilwell Varco, Inc., 757 F.3d 416,
421-23 (5th Cir. 2014) (reversing district court’s finding of waiver and
holding that litigation conduct of codefendants cannot be attributed to
unserved defendant for waiver purposes).
63
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XM Radio Inc.,67 the Ninth Circuit applied the common law
defense of lack of mutual assent to rule that no valid agreement to
arbitrate existed between a satellite radio customer and the radio
company. There, the customer bought a car with a pre-loaded 90day trial subscription to satellite radio. One month after buying the
car, Sirius XM sent a “Welcome Kit” to the customer, which
contained, among other things, a Customer Agreement with an
arbitration clause and a class action waiver. The customer never
opened the Welcome Kit. Alleging he received unauthorized
phone calls from Sirius XM during the trial period, the customer
brought a class action under the federal Telephone Consumer
Protection Act.68 Sirius XM moved to compel individual
arbitration. The district court granted the motion.69
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed and ruled that there
was no agreement to arbitrate because of a lack of mutual assent.
The Court of Appeals found that the customer’s failure to open the
Welcome Kit meant he could not have seen or read the Customer
Agreement containing the arbitration clause. Thus, the customer
could not have assented to the arbitration provision. The court
distinguished prior “shrinkwrap” cases that found mutual assent
when a customer opened the packaging of a consumer product
because the customer here never purchased anything directly from
the consumer company.70 Rather, the customer purchased a car
directly from Toyota, and he had no reason to know that the
Welcome Kit that arrived a month later had a Customer Agreement
with Sirius XM in it. Without notice of the existence of an
agreement, the customer could not have assented to it.71
Therefore, the class action could proceed in court.
67

771 F.3d 559 (9th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 561-64.
69
Id. at 564.
70
Id. at 567.
71
Id. at 567-68; see also Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171,
1173 (9th Cir. 2014) (refusing to compel arbitration pursuant to a
provision in company’s Terms of Use where customer used Barnes &
68
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C.

Who is a “Customer” Under FINRA
Rule 12200?

In FINRA arbitration, even in the absence of a pre-dispute
arbitration clause in an agreement between the parties, a FINRA
member firm must arbitrate a claim if “requested by a customer,”
“[t]he dispute is between a customer and a member or associated
person of a member; and [t]he dispute arises in connection with the
business activities of the member or the associated person . . . .”72
Thus, in a customer case, respondents may resist
arbitration on the ground that claimant is not a “customer” of the
FINRA member firm within the meaning of FINRA Customer
Code Rule 12200. FINRA does not define “customer,” except for
its mention in Rule 12100(i) (a “customer shall not include a
broker or dealer”). Courts continue to refine the definition of the
term “customer” under FINRA Rule 12200.
The day after last year’s PLI Securities Arbitration
program, the Second Circuit detailed “the precise boundaries of the
FINRA meaning of ‘customer.'” In Citigroup Global Markets
Inc. v. Abbar,73 the Second Circuit concluded that a Saudi
businessman who managed family trusts that lost $383 million
invested with a U.K. affiliate of Citigroup, Inc. (“Citi UK) was not
a “customer” of Citigroup Global Markets, Inc. (“Citi NY”) under
Rule 12200, and thus could not compel Citi NY to arbitrate their
Noble's website to purchase a product but was “never prompted to assent
to the Terms of Use and never in fact read them”). Accord Walker v.
Builddirect.Com Technologies Inc., __ P.3d __, 2015 OK 30, ¶ 10, 2015
WL 207496 (Okla. May 5, 2015) (answering question certified to it by
the Tenth Circuit and concluding that “Terms of Sale” located on
defendant’s website, which included an arbitration clause, were not
incorporated by reference into the parties' written contractual agreement).
72
FINRA R. 12200.
73
761 F.3d 268 (2d Cir. 2014).
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dispute. The Court of Appeals issued “a bright-line rule” and held
that “a ‘customer’ under FINRA Rule 12200 is one who, while not
a broker or dealer, either (1) purchases a good or service from a
FINRA member, or (2) has an account with a FINRA
member.”74 The court reasoned that a “simple, predictable and
suitably broad definition of ‘customer'” is “necessary” to avoid a
“sprawling litigation” that its previous definition required, which
“defeats the express goals of arbitration to yield economical and
swift outcomes.”75 Because Abbar purchased no goods or services
from Citi NY (though some of its employees helped develop
trading strategies for his accounts) and had no account with it, he
was not a “customer” of Citi NY.76
Of course, the court recognized that, as with all legal
definitions, exceptions exist for “rare instances of injustice.”77 In
my view, this exception seems to swallow the rule, as litigants will
now call for a detailed examination of the facts to mine for
injustices.
D.

Can a Forum Selection Clause Trump the Duty
to Arbitrate?

A question related to “who is a customer” is whether a
FINRA member’s duty to arbitrate at the request of a customer
under Rule 12200 supersedes a forum selection clause in a
customer agreement. The Courts of Appeal currently are split on
the question.

74

Id. at 275.
Id. at 276.
76
Id.; see also SagePoint Fin., Inc. v. Small, No. 15-CV-0571, 2015 BL
150905 (E.D.N.Y. May 15, 2015) (applying Abbar test and finding
investor, who invested with an associated person four years after he left
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Last August, the Second Circuit followed an April 2014
decision by the Ninth Circuit in Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. City of
Reno78 — rejecting an opposite holding by the Fourth Circuit79 —
and held that a forum selection clause in a contract supersedes a
broker-dealer’s obligation to arbitrate disputes with a customer
under FINRA Rule 12200. The Court of Appeals, in a single
opinion, resolved two cases: Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. Golden
Empire Sch. Fin. Auth., and Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc. v. N.C.
E. Mun. Power Agency.80 In the first case, Golden Empire
Schools Financing Authority & Kern High School District issued
approximately $125 million of auction-rate securities (“ARS”) in
2004, 2006 and 2007, for which Goldman Sachs was an
underwriter and broker-dealer. In the second case, the North
Carolina Eastern Municipal Power Agency retained Citigroup
Global Markets Inc. as its underwriter and broker-dealer. In both
cases, the issuers claimed that the member firms fraudulently
induced them to issue the ARS.81
For each issuance, the parties executed an underwriter
agreement, and a broker dealer agreement. While the underwriting
agreements were silent as to dispute resolution, the broker-dealer
agreements contained forum selection clauses which required “all
actions and proceedings” related to the transactions between the
parties be brought in court.82

78

747 F. 3d 733 (9th Cir. 2014) (concluding that the City of Reno, which
had retained Goldman, Sachs for advisory and underwriting services in
connection with its issuance of auction-rate securities to finance a series
of city projects, was a “customer” under FINRA Rule 12200). For a
more detailed discussion of the Reno case, see Arbitration Case Law
Update 2014, in PLI Securities Arbitration 2014 Coursebook, at pp. 2425.
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UBS Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Carilion Clinic, 706 F.3d 319 (4th Cir. 2013).
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764 F.3d 210 (2d Cir. 2014).
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Id. at 212-13.
82
Id.

19

In 2012, Golden Empire commenced a FINRA arbitration,
alleging that Goldman fraudulently induced it to issue the ARS.
Also in 2012, NCEMPA brought a similar FINRA arbitration
against Citigroup. In both cases, the member firm sought to enjoin
the FINRA arbitration on the ground that the forum selection
clause superseded its duty to arbitrate under Rule 12200.83 The
issuer responded that, because it was a customer of a FINRA
member firm, the firm had a duty to arbitrate the dispute under
FINRA Rule 12200.84
The Court of Appeals held that the forum selection clause
superseded FINRA’s mandatory arbitration rule.85 The court
reasoned that Rule 12200 was a “default” agreement to arbitrate
that was trumped by the later-executed agreement – the forum
selection clause.86 The court further reasoned that the underwriting
agreement contained a merger clause and thus the earlier
agreement under Rule 12200 merged into the forum selection
clause.87
I believe the Second Circuit’s ruling is wrong. A
fundamental premise to the ruling (that I believe is flawed) is that
Rule 12200 is an agreement to arbitrate that somehow is executed
before the parties entered into the underwriting agreements.
However, the duty to arbitrate arose at the exact same time as the
execution of the agreements establishing the broker-customer
relationship. And, as I see it, the duty to arbitrate is ongoing – at
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Id. at 214.
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Id. at 215.
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Id.; see also Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Tracy, 2015 WL
170241, *51 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2015) (slip op.) (holding that “more
specific” forum selection clause trumped duty to arbitrate a member
dispute with its employee under FINRA Rule 13200).
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Id. at 216. In an interesting development, the Second Circuit agreed to
stay the issuance of its mandate blocking arbitration to allow the issuers
time to appeal the case to the Supreme Court.
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any time a customer can invoke Rule 12200 and request a FINRA
member firm to arbitrate a dispute.
In addition, one argument the parties did not pursue is that
recently amended sec. 29(a) of the Exchange Act voids the parties’
forum selection clause. That provision voids “[a]ny condition,
stipulation, or provision binding any person to waive compliance
with any provision of this title or of any rule or regulation
thereunder, or of any rule of a self-regulatory organization…”88
Dodd-Frank amended § 29(a) to include the phrase “or of any rule
of a self-regulatory organization.” Thus, since 2010, § 29(a)
explicitly invalidates provisions in brokerage agreements that
require customers to waive compliance with FINRA rules. To the
extent courts have held in the past that parties could contract
around FINRA rules, that line of cases seems to be vitiated by
amended § 29(a).
Now that there is a split in the circuits, perhaps the issue
will ultimately make its way to the Supreme Court.
E.

Nonsignatories to Arbitration
Agreements

Under state law theories of equitable estoppel, agency or
third-party beneficiary, nonsignatories may be able to compel
arbitration of claims arising out of an arbitration agreement
between signatories.89 Under the doctrine of equitable estoppel,
generally a nonsignatory can enforce an arbitration clause with a
signatory:
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15 U.S.C. §78cc (2014).
See Arthur Andersen LLP v Carlisle, 556 U.S. 624 (2009) (holding
that, under the FAA, state law principles may permit an arbitration
agreement to be enforced by or against a nonsignatory).
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(1)
when a signatory must rely on the terms of the
written agreement in asserting its claims against the nonsignatory
or the claims are ‘intimately founded in and intertwined with’ the
underlying contract, and
(2)
when the signatory alleges substantially
interdependent and concerted misconduct by the nonsignatory and
another signatory and ‘the allegations of interdependent
misconduct [are][ founded in or intimately connected with the
obligations of the underlying agreement.’90
Likewise, if a nonsignatory can demonstrate it is a thirdparty beneficiary of an arbitration agreement, it can enforce that
agreement against signatories.91 Under the agency theory, a
nonsignatory can invoke arbitration against a signatory “if a
preexisting confidential relationship, such as an agency
relationship between the nonsignatory and one of the parties to the
arbitration agreement, makes it equitable to impose the duty to
arbitrate upon the nonsignatory.”92
In the past year, some Courts of Appeal narrowly
construed these three exceptions.93 Other courts were more willing
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See Kramer v. Toyota Motor Corp., 705 F.3d 1122, 1128-29 (9th Cir.
2013) (internal citations omitted).
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See Fundamental Admin. Servs., LLC v. Patton, 504 F. App’x 694, 698
(10th Cir. 2012).
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See Murphy v. DirectTV, Inc., 724 F.3d 1218, 1232 (9th Cir. 2013)
(internal quotations and citations omitted).
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E.g., Flintkote Co. v. Aviva PLLC, 769 F.3d 215 (3d Cir. 2014)
(reversing district court’s invocation of equitable estoppel doctrine to
compel nonsignatory to arbitrate); Griswold v. Coventry First LLC, 762
F.3d 264 (3d Cir. 2014) (affirming district court’s refusal to compel
nonsignatory to arbitrate on equitable estoppel grounds). Accord Pinnacle
Trust Co., L.L.C. v. McTaggart, 152 So. 3d 1123, 1124 (Miss. 2014)
(refusing to compel nonsignatory beneficiaries to trust agreement to
arbitrate claims against trust advisor for mishandling funds because the
agreement specifically excluded nonsignatories, including third-party
beneficiaries).

22

to compel arbitration with a nonsignatory.94
F.

Unavailability of forum

The Eleventh Circuit this past year refused to compel
arbitration of a dispute that was subject to an arbitration clause
because the designated forum was not available. In Inetianbor v.
Cashcall, Inc.,95 plaintiff borrowed money from defendant, a loan
servicer, at a high interest rate. The loan agreement contained a
pre-dispute arbitration clause that called for “‘Arbitration, which
shall be conducted by the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Nation by
an authorized representative in accordance with its consumer
dispute rules and the terms of this Agreement.’”96 When Plaintiff
sued in district court for the Southern District of Florida, the court
initially compelled arbitration. However, when plaintiff returned
with a letter from the tribe that stated that it “does not authorize
Arbitration,” the district court ultimately denied the motion.97
The Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that the forum
selection clause in the arbitration agreement was an “integral part
of the agreement to arbitrate” rather than an “ancillary logistical
provision.”98 Since the tribal forum was not available to arbitrate
the dispute, the court could preclude arbitration under “strong”
Eleventh Circuit precedent.99
94

See Torres v. Simpatico, Inc., 781 F.3d 963, 971 (8 th Cir. 2015)
(affirming district court’s order compelling nonsignatory to arbitrate as
third-party beneficiary). Accord Machado v. System4 LLC, 28 N.E.3d
401 (Mass. 2015) (compelling franchisees to arbitrate claims against
nonsignatory regional franchisor under doctrine of equitable estoppel).
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768 F.3d 1346 (11th Cir. 2014).
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Id. at 1348-49.
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Id. at 1350 (internal quotation and citation omitted).
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Id. (citing Brown v. ITT Consumer Fin. Corp., 211 F.3d 1217, 1222
(11th Cir. 2000) (holding that “the failure of the chosen forum preclude[s]
arbitration” whenever “the choice of forum is an integral part of the
agreement to arbitrate, rather than an ancillary logistical concern”)).
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G.

Vacating Arbitration Awards

To challenge a valid arbitration award that is governed by
the FAA, parties must establish one of the four grounds listed
under section 10 of the FAA.100 Disputants rarely invoke section
10(a)(1) (“where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or
undue means”), but they more frequently invoke sections 10(a)(2)(4), which are discussed below.
1.

Evident Partiality

Losing parties to arbitration awards can seek vacatur
pursuant to FAA § 10(a)(2) if they show “evident partiality” in one
or more arbitrators. Courts have had difficulty developing a test
for “evident partiality,” since the Supreme Court’s only decision
under that subsection is the 47-year old decision in Commonwealth
Coatings v. Continental Casualty Co.101 That case yielded plurality
and concurring opinions that are difficult to synthesize. Most
circuits follow a version of the test set forth thirty years ago by the
Second Circuit:102 “evident partiality” is “where a reasonable
person would have to conclude that an arbitrator was partial to one
party to the arbitration.”103
Courts differ on how an arbitrator’s failure to disclose
potential sources of conflicts of interest factors into an evident
partiality analysis. In one interesting case this past year, the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated a district court order
intervening in an ongoing arbitration and disqualifying an
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See Hall St. Assoc., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008).
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arbitrator on the grounds that respondents in the arbitration would
likely prevail on a motion to vacate for evident partiality.104
After an arbitrator was appointed to hear disputes over
condominium purchases, respondents learned the arbitrator was
involved in the litigation finance business. When the AAA denied
respondents’ pre-hearing disqualification motion, respondents
sought extraordinary relief in the district court.105 Respondents
asked the district court to intervene in the arbitration for purposes
of disqualifying the arbitrator before the hearing so as to avoid the
delay and expense of a hearing.106
The district court ruled that the arbitrator’s involvement in
the litigation finance activities suggested an eventual award could
be vacated for “evident partiality.” The lower court “reasoned that
the undisclosed facts regarding Hare's litigation financing activities
suggested he had a financial interest in the outcome of the
arbitration, because a victory and large financial award for Sussex
would help Hare promote his company, which was designed to
generate profits from funding large, potentially profitable
litigations.”107
Claimants filed with the Court of Appeal a petition for a
writ of mandamus directing the district court to vacate its order
disqualifying the arbitrator. The Ninth Circuit granted the writ.
The Court concluded that the circumstances did not give rise to a
claim of “evident partiality” within the meaning of FAA §10(a)(2).
The court reasoned that the “undisclosed facts regarding [the
arbitrator’s] modest efforts to start a company to attract investors
for litigation financing do not give rise to a reasonable impression
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In re Sussex, 781 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 2015).
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that [the arbitrator] would be partial toward either party.”108 In
addition, the court concluded that the district court’s decision to
intervene pre-award was “clear error,” as respondents would have
the option of filing a motion to vacate if they lost the arbitration.109
In a state case, the Supreme Court of Alabama vacated a
FINRA arbitration award on the ground of evident partiality.110
Claimant, the administrator of a self-insured group workers’
compensation fund, sued respondents, which served as the
investment advisor and broker-dealer for the fund, for breach of
fiduciary duty and other claims arising out their alleged
mishandling of the fund’s investments.
After the panel denied all of claimant’s claims, claimant
moved to vacate the award under FAA §10(a)(2) on the grounds
that two of the three panelists “failed to disclose material and
relevant information during the arbitrator-selection process.”111
Claimant alleged first that one of the public panelists failed to
disclose that he was “a defendant in five lawsuits alleging against
him claims substantially similar to those asserted” in this
arbitration.112 In addition, claimant alleged that the non-public
arbitrator failed to disclose that he was a long-time vice
president/partner in a financial services firm that “had a close,
ongoing, and material relationship with [respondent] and its
counsel at the time of the arbitration proceeding.”113 The trial
court denied the motion to vacate.
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The Supreme Court of Alabama reversed. The court first
adopted a “reasonable impression of partiality” standard rather
than require that a movant demonstrate “actual bias” in order to
succeed on a §10(a)(2) motion.114 The court then found that the
non-public arbitrator’s failures to disclose did present a
“reasonable impression of partiality.” As a result, the court
vacated the award, concluding that claimant had demonstrated that
at least one arbitrator was evidently partial.115
2. Refusal to Hold a Hearing
A court can vacate an award under FAA §10(a)(3) if the
losing party shows “the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in
refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or
in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the
controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of
any party have been prejudiced.”116 The Second Circuit recently
interpreted this ground:
Vacatur under 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3) is warranted only when
the arbitration proceedings were “fundamentally unfair.”
Fairness requires arbitrators to give a party an “adequate
opportunity to present its evidence and argument,” but it
does not require them to “hear all the evidence proffered
by a party.” Moreover, “[a]rbitrators have substantial
discretion to admit or exclude evidence.”117
In Global Gold, the Court of Appeal denied the motion to vacate
under this prong despite the arbitral tribunal’s refusal to conduct an
114
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evidentiary hearing because it considered documents and heard
oral arguments before reaching the challenged ruling.118 Thus, the
arbitration proceedings were not “fundamentally unfair.”
3.

Exceeding Powers

Since arbitrators derive all of their authority to decide
disputes from the parties’ arbitration agreement, a court can vacate
an award under §10(a)(4) if the arbitrators exceed the authority
provided by that agreement.119 Under this ground for vacatur,
courts consider only “whether the arbitrators even arguably
interpreted the Agreement in reaching their award; …not whether
their interpretations of the Agreement or the governing law were
correct.”120 The Fifth Circuit noted recently that, “[b]y submitting
issues for an arbitrator's consideration, parties may expand an
arbitrator's authority beyond that provided by the original
arbitration agreement.”121
This past year, the Supreme Court of South Dakota
vacated an award that included attorney’s fees to claimant when
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the parties’ arbitration agreement expressly provided that “each
shall pay their own attorney's fees.”122
4.

Manifest Disregard of the Law

Since the Supreme Court’s holding in Hall St. Assoc.,
L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc.123 that the FAA provides the exclusive
grounds for review of an arbitration award and parties to an
arbitration agreement cannot contractually expand the judicial
grounds of review, the circuit courts have split on whether an
arbitration panel’s “manifest disregard of the law” is a valid
ground to vacate an arbitration award. The Supreme Court
expressly declined to resolve this split in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v.
AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp.124 The circuit split continues unchanged
since last year’s Arbitration Law Update, as follows:

The Second, Fourth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits
acknowledge the continued vitality of the “manifest disregard”
ground of vacatur.125
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See Black Hills Surgical Physicians, LLC v. Setliff, III, 855 N.W.2d
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Sec., LLC v. Brand, 671 F.3d 472, 482 (4th Cir. 2012) (“Although we
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30713,*4 (6th Cir. Jan. 6, 2014) (suggesting that the Sixth Circuit might
revisit the issue, “which has not been firmly settled”).
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The Fifth, Eighth and Eleventh Circuits have
expressly ruled that manifest disregard is no longer a valid vacatur
ground.126

The First and Tenth Circuits have addressed
“manifest disregard” subsequent to Hall Street, but only in dicta.127

The Third and Tenth Circuits have expressly
declined to address the issue.128

The Seventh Circuit has held that “manifest
disregard” is not a ground of vacatur, except if arbitrators order
parties to violate the legal rights of others.129
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